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Social Welfare in the Emerging World Culture*
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

Introduction
It is a widely shared view in the United States today that we are
witnessed the sunset of the Atlantic age, with the declining world influence
of the communities of the Atlantic rim, and the dawn of a new Pacific age.
Such an historic shift is one of many taking place in the world today with
important implications for social welfare. One of the most dramatic impacts
of the new Pacific age upon the United States has been the recent upsurge of
immigration, which has nearly reached the all-time high of European
immigration in the early 1900's.1 (Washington Post Weekly, 1988, 31.)
The bi-polar political division of the world since 1945 has obscured the
emergence of other, completely new cultural unities and possibilities arising
on the heels of developments in communications and transportation
technology. In the age when even the American and European right appear
willing to accept the spirit of glasnost and perestroika, it appears appropriate
to address some of those implications and possibilities.
The extraordinary events of 1989 throughout Eastern Europe, as well as
world reaction to the tragic events in Tian An Meng Square are further
evidence of the essential correctness of the political convergence thesis which
argues that capitalist and socialist economies are slowly adopting one
another's best features and converging toward a new common mean. My
hope is that, whatever turns these social developments take, the humanistic
values upon which social science and social work were founded will be
important components of that future.

Welfare Values
This paper, like social work itself, is an exercise in normative, value-based
rather than purely objective social science. Not only is this a paper with
values, it is also a paper about values. Some might even call it an exercise in
utopian thinking. The paper argues for the emergence of a world-wide
universal pluralistic culture, in which a common core of humanitarian values
will eventually be institutionalized in the major institutions of each society in
ways which are consistent with the unique historical, cultural, economic and
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political context of that society. It is this process of adaptation of universal,
or at least trans-cultural, values to the unique circumstances of individual
cultures which can be called "indigenization".
For purposes of this paper, I assume, without attempting to identify them
in full, that there are a cluster of distinctive beliefs and values that can be
termed "welfare values". Welfare values are found in many, if not all, of the
contemporary societies of the world today. Among these values are a belief
in the inherent dignity of human life; commitment to human rights and
personal freedom; commitment to personal and social development; concern
for improving the condition of the poor and disadvantaged; a general desire
to diminish pain and suffering; and tolerance of individual and group
diversity.
While I am certainly not naive enough to suggest that societies and
governments everywhere currently operate on the basis of these values, I do
wish to suggest that there is a growing community of nations devoted to their
observance, and that in the international community major departures from
these values are matters of world concern.
It is generally accepted that many of these values arose out of the Jewish,
Christian and Moslem religious traditions; that they were secularized into
the "humanism" and "humanitarianism" of Western Europe in the
Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment; that they have been widely
disseminated throughout the world in the 19th and 20th centuries; and that
institutionalization of these values in government constitutes what we term a
welfare state.2 That there is great institutional variation in welfare states,
each of which has adapted to the unique demands and constraints of an
indigenous political culture is easy to confirm.
If this is so, it is likely that distinctive subsets of welfare values, some
of which have yet to be identified as such, undergird the social welfare
institutions growing up independently outside the West. The meritocratic
recruitment procedures of Confucian bureaucracy, for example, perhaps
should be seen as a successful case of the long-term practice of opportunity
theory in human history.3 Likewise, what might be called mental health
values of contemplation borrowed from Buddhism (and no doubt markedly
transformed in the process) , and the "holistic health" values borrowed from
oriental medicine have recently had much impact on American health care
practice. It is important that the international social welfare community
begin to identify and recognize these values for what they are.
The world-wide dissemination of these and other welfare values--in
such highly diverse forms as multinational efforts in the face of drought and
other natural disasters, abhorrence to abuse of political prisoners, and
international support for literacy--are components of what appears now to be
the long-term emergence of a world culture, or terraculture. In the west, we
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have spoken of "mankind" and "the human community" at least since the
Enlightenment, even when the term really applied only to white European
males. In the future, the notion of a culturally, if not politically, unified
human community appears likely to become more than a vague abstraction.
The emergence of a single, uniform world culture incorporating
welfare values would be one of the truly momentous events in human
history, fully comparable with the agricultural, urban and industrial
revolutions. We are still far from such an occurrence. However, throughout
much of the current century, and particularly since 1945, we have seen the
global spread of increasingly familiar international cultural patterns.
The processes of change which have occurred in the world during the
past four decades are multiple and complex, and a full analysis of these
changes would be a daunting task. However, we can easily note some of the
most obvious changes: the end of the vast European colonial empires in
Africa and Asia, together with the growth of airport, skyscraper and
shantytown urbanism in virtually every major city on earth, the collapse of
an enormous number of traditional cultures and ways of life together with an
almost universal embrace of mass consumer culture; astonishing advances in
transportation and communication, including most recently electronic
computing, which have brought virtually every surviving human culture into
proximity with all others in an unprecedented juxtaposition which gives
entirely new meaning to the term cultural pluralism.
What, in this brave new world of Coke, Pan Am, IBM, Sony and Hyundai,
is the proper place for universal welfare values and what is the proper role
for the distinctiveness and traditions of nations, cultures and subcultures?
The issue is certainly a cause for concern for thoughtful persons everywhere.
Because of the sensitivity of social problems and social problem-solving
techniques to cultural and subcultural influence, the issue is also a major one
for the internationalization of social work practice. It is in this context that
the interplay between universal values and indigenous cultures, which is the
theme of this conference, takes on its greatest importance for us.
Indigenization
The term indigenization is used here in contrast with homogenization or
blending, as the cultural process most likely to impact upon social welfare
values and ideals in the short-term future. It has already been clearly
established that culture contact does not lead directly to homogeneity
(sameness). For example, after three centuries of African, European and
Asian immigration to the United States where the idea of the "melting pot"
originated, major ethnic and subcultural diversities remain. It is likely that
contact between stable, non-immigrant cultures may contribute instead to
cultural diversity and pluralism, political pluralism and a gradual, long term
adjustment process as established truths and cherished folkways and mores
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from each culture are fitted to new circumstances and other different, but
similarly deep beliefs and values.
Such adjustments has always been part of the immigrant experience.
What is different about the world today is that the marvels of transportation
and communications are imposing the same requirements for adaptation and
adjustment on those who stayed at home as well. We can call this process
indigenization: In its intercultural aspect, it is the peaceful adjustment of
separate, stable, territorially located cultures to one another via
international trade, transportation, communication, and other avenues of
diffusion. In the late twentieth century, this process is already far enough
along that one might be brash enough to speak of an emerging world order or
"terraculture".

The Emerging Terraculture
The term terraculture was chosen here because it appears that this
emerging cultural order is very rapidly being embraced by the majority of the
entire earth's population. Although many aspects of post-industrialization
have been criticized by cultural high-brows, romantics and latter day
Jeremiahs, the onslaught of prefabricated clothing, refrigerators and
appliances, automobiles, electricity, radio, television, pop culture and other
"consumer goods" which characterize and mark the advance of this revolution
is universally and warmly embraced by peoples everywhere. From a social
welfare standpoint, many of these developments (such as refrigeration) have
also brought with them major improvements in public health and social
welfare.
The story today is much the same everywhere: Formerly rural,
isolated peoples regret deeply the loss of traditional ways of life and fear for
the loss of cherished cultural heritages of beliefs, rituals, ceremonies and
other folkways. However, they are also unwilling to abandon pickup trucks,
indoor plumbing, electricity and refrigeration and other accoutrements of
"modern" life and return to the old ways. This is as true in rural Appalachia
as it is in Nigeria or rural Korea.
The force of tradition in a given culture may not always go gently into the
night -- as anti-modernist movements as diverse as the English Luddites, the
European Counter-Reformation, the Iranian Revolution,
Quebec
Nationalism, the American Indian Movement, the Northern Irish, Basques,
Kurds, Sikhs, and American evangelical Christians attest. There even are
cases of successful long-term holdouts against modernization, such as the
Shakers, Amish and Mennonites, and the Navaho in America, for example.
There would appear to be no cases in the world today of major cultures which
have completely and successfully turned their backs on modernization for
any length of time, however.
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Cultural diffusion always occurs unevenly. In every contemporary
culture today, one could find locals, people whose entire world view is
internal to culture and community and whose concern for "the rest of the
world" is slight. Each of us--Japanese, Korean and American--has had our
own native traditions of isolationism and xenophobia (fear of strangers). In
many, perhaps all cultures, one also finds the cosmopolitans, cultural natives
with an interest in, curiosity about, and knowledge of the outside world with
its great cultural variety and many options.
In America, missionaries, anthropologists, journalists, diplomats and
"internationalists" -- persons from all walks of life with an interest in and
curiosity about the world have been among the key cosmopolitans. Since
1940, those performing national military service have emerged as one of the
largest and most varied groups of American cosmopolitans, because of the
extensive system of American military installations outside the U.S. More
recently, American businessmen -- long an important bastion of isolationism
-- have emerged as a key class of contemporary cosmopolitans.
The challenge for internationally minded persons in every society is how
to assure that universal welfare values are supported and advanced in the
emerging world culture, without falling into the well-known traps of
ethnocentrism. Although this may be a formidable challenge, it is not
entirely without precedent. In some respects, the task is not unlike that
faced by social reformers in New York or Chicago in the early 1900's, when
dozens of different ethnic, racial and language groups often lived on the same
city blocks. It was in this environment that the social work commitments to
respect for individual differences and personal uniqueness were first forged.
Today, the challenge for social work internationally is to translate those
same approaches and that same sensitivity into international contexts. What
may be needed today is the functional equivalent of the settlement house. It
will be truly unfortunate if social work remains what it all too often is today:
A simple transfer of American methods to different cultural contexts. A far
more productive strategy would be to pursue a vigorous program of
indigenization of social work: to begin at the level of basic universal values
and to develop social technologies appropriate to the unique time and place
characteristics of individual cultures.
Yet how is this to be done? One major starting point would involve a
research program of vast proportions: the identification of those elements in
each culture which contribute to social welfare values and to an assessment
of the likelihood of success in applying those values in other contexts. Harry
Stack Sullivan proposed just such an undertaking more than 50 years ago,
and certainly the knowledge of fields such as philosophy, anthropology and
history will be very helpful in such an enterprise.4
This is precisely the
kind of study my colleagues, Sung Lai Boo and John Peters, have undertaken
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in their examination of the contemporary social welfare implications of the
traditional Korean concepts of Hyangyak and Ture .5
A second major project might involve the promotion of special forms of
cross-cultural education, in which the welfare values and practices of one
society are systematically introduced to citizens of another. Certainly, this is
what the American missionaries attempted on a world-wide scale during the
19th century with the introduction of orphanages and schools. In the world
of social work practice, such social change activity probably would be placed
somewhere between contemporary social development planning and
education. Let us not forget, however, that in the world of the emerging
terraculture, advertising, marketing and mass communications strategies
probably also have a role to play in such ventures.
Because some welfare values have already been so widely disseminated in
the world, we now already observe the ways in which this indefinite core or
what we might term universal humanitarianism are being adapted to the
unique needs of individual societies and states. The political use of the
welfare state by the conservative and liberal parties of Great Britain, for
example, as a tool in the class conflict gives special meaning to the concept of
"universal services" as it is used there.
Likewise, in the United States,
which has a long legacy of commitment to the application of scientific
management concepts to social welfare administration, the symbolic
importance of "efficiency" takes on an importance in welfare policy debates
which many non-Americans find difficult to understand.

Welfare States
One of the issues which requires some examination in light of the
phenomenon of post-modern conservatism in Great Britain, France, the
United States, Canada, and elsewhere is our continued allegiance to the
concept of the universal welfare state as the preferred provider of all major
services as well as income maintenance programs.
In general, social workers and some sociologists tend to use the term
welfare state to refer only to public, tax-supported transfer programs of social
insurance, social assistance and social services. By contrast, political
scientists and economists tend to extend the term "welfare state" to also
include many forms of regulatory activity, such as workers compensation or
agricultural subsidy payments as well as transfer payments and public
services. This latter approach gets very close to the distinction Richard
Titmuss made between fiscal, occupational and social welfare.
Highly important for modern welfare state theory and the process of
indigenization is the distinction between several types of modern states in
relation to the people being governed.
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On this dimension, there are the states, like Japan and South Korea, and
many of the states of 19th century Europe, where the people are a single
racial, cultural and language group. In such cases, those who control the
welfare state and those who benefit from it are members of a common
community. In one way or another, the struggle for adoption of social welfare
policy and the building of social welfare institutions in these societies is a
community development effort and can be grounded in the mutuality, unity
and fellow-feeling of the people.
By contrast, there are bi-cultural states, like South Africa, Israel, or the
United States before desegregation, where the population is divided into two
distinct (and antagonistic) groups, one of whom controls the state apparatus,
to the disadvantage of the other. In this case, the prospects of a universal
welfare state with uniform coverage seems highly unlikely, and the problem
of institution building is particularly difficult for the group out of power.
The dominant group, of course, has a definite advantage in its control of the
state, while welfare state institutions for the submissive group are either
distinctly inferior or built indigenously outside the state without its obvious
advantages of financing and social control.
Finally, there are the pluralistic states like the contemporary United
States, the Soviet Union, China, the states of western Europe, and many of
the emergent states of post-colonial Africa. Welfare institutions in these
cases must either be group-specific or grounded in universal values with
considerable political cogency, such as Anglo-American "natural rights" or
the French "universal rights of man". The political problem faced by welfare
proponents in these societies--even when they are in the majority--is whether
appeals to such universal values can be made sufficiently powerful and
convincing to overcome traditional ethnic, tribal, racial and other cleavages.
Far too often in the past the answer has been negative.
The American
struggle with racism, which has been ongoing for more than 100 years, offers
a sobering example of the difficulties involved.
From a world perspective, the problem of welfare in any world culture
which emerges in the future, is not unlike that of the pluralist states, and the
problems of the unitary states are not unlike the problems of distinct ethnic
communities within those states.

Beyond The Welfare State
Each nation state which has embraced all or part of the welfare state
ideal has done so in its own way, and in light of its own unique history.
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and other European welfare states have, in
fact been slowly building welfare institutions on the foundations of the past
for at least 500 years. In the United States the legacy of constitution, rugged
individualism, federalism and social darwinism have created what is
sometimes referred to as the "reluctant welfare state" committed to
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gradualism and disjointed incrementalism in policy development, and also
committed to the pluralism of coexisting public, nonprofit and commercial
institutions.
In discussing welfare in international context, we should not continue to
be preoccupied exclusively with the state. Certainly, the coercive powers of
the modern state are formidable weapons in dealing with social problems
such as family violence, economic exploitation, and dependency. Likewise,
the ability of the democratic welfare states to peacefully redirect portions of
the surplus production of their economies without undermining productive
enterprise is still one of the strongest weapons available against the historic
scourges of all societies: poverty, illiteracy, disease and violence.
We need to remember, however, that welfare values have their origins
and take their strength from outside the state. In particular, Judaism and
Christianity have been foremost among the world-religions in the
promulgation of welfare values.6
Likewise, it was religious missionaries,
and not political vanguards, who carried welfare values outside the western
civilization of the Mediterranean/ European community. This is as true for
the United States, with its Quakers,
Lutherans, and its embrace of the
English Poor Law tradition, as it is of the rest of the Americas, Asia or Africa.
Likewise, we need to remind ourselves also that welfare values are also
embedded in the mutual aid obligations of family, neighborhood and
community members in most of the world's cultures. One of the first things
which most immigrant populations did (and do) upon arriving in the
Americas, for example, is locate one another and form mutual benefit
societies and associations.

Welfare Society?
Full indigenization of welfare values in any society, therefore, is not
merely a matter of developing comprehensive welfare state coverage. It is a
matter of attaining the welfare society. More than two decades ago,
Wilensky and LeBeaux suggested the likelihood of a gradual transition from
welfare state to welfare society.7 However, much like the earlier suggestion
by Marx of the eventual "withering away" of the state, their comment was
little more than a passing remark, and no detailed analysis or argument in
support of this development is offered by them. In the two decades which
have passed since their comment was first offered, there has been relatively
little systematic attention to this idea in social welfare thought.
The belief that welfare is in some way the exclusive concern or
preoccupation of the state is one of the most serious fallacies which has crept
into recent social welfare thought. Among other things, it has reduced
American social policy concern in the 1980's to a preoccupation with
Presidential politics, when Presidents seldom, if ever, have had a positive
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impact upon American social policy, and President Reagan has proven to be
no exception. The "neo-conservative" budget cutting and program reduction
activities which are attributed to him were already underway prior to 1980,
and his influence in the domestic social policy arena in other ways has
probably been grossly exaggerated.
It is the major thesis of this paper that the world-wide process of
indigenization of welfare values is not exclusively a process of implementing
pension, social insurance and other public transfer payment programs and
regulatory mechanisms governing public health, and personal and economic
security within the unique legal and political contexts of separate states. Nor
is indigenization simply a process of integrating humanitarian values into
the dominant political culture of each of the world's nation-states.
The ultimate measure of the indigenization of social welfare values into
any of the world's cultures is the integration of welfare values into all of the
major institutions of that culture.
In the welfare society, not only
government, but also religion, education, business, leisure, mass
communication and all other social institutions will reflect the impact of
welfare values.
One can see many diverse signs of this trend already in the developed
countries, whether in the form of "social issue" movies, television, newspaper
and magazine coverage, the growth of commercial health insurance, or
religiously organized voluntary social services. In this respect, the growing
influence of "privatization" and the expansion of commercial social services in
the United States probably represents an indigenous response of a
predominantly business culture to universal welfare values, however much
American social workers may dislike or distrust this strategy.
In the "post industrial" world where service industries are supplementing
or replacing manufacturing industries, one thing seems increasingly clear:
Expansion of health and welfare services--whether as commercial services for
middle class clients able to afford them, or occupational welfare "fringe
benefits" associated with employment--are important emerging forms of
economic development.

Human Welfare and Patronage
Along with growing awareness of the proliferation of welfare societies
should come increased attention to the domain of voluntary, nonprofit,
associational and citizen action efforts along this line. Such efforts have long
been a stable characteristic of American social welfare.
As Kramer and
other voluntary action scholars have shown, voluntary social welfare activity
is not limited to the United States, but is also found in the Netherlands,
Britain, Israel, France, Canada, Japan and many other nations.8 Yoo has
recently made the case for increased volunteer effort in Korea.9
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There are many interesting and vital issues of indigenization which are
opened up for the societies of the Pacific Rim, including Korea, Japan, Hong
Kong, Taiwan and others by the prospects for indigenization of welfare
values associated with voluntary community action. Given the economic
growth of this region, however, none is more important than what might be
termed the indigenization of the principal of patronage.
For those familiar with the dual uses of this term in American social
science, I am not referring here to vote buying, nepotism, controlling
appointments to political office or other behavior sometimes associated with
the term political patronage. I am referring, instead, to the conscious
cultivation of an indigenous philanthropic tradition in which wealthy
members of a community voluntarily devote portions of their wealth to
community improvement, development or betterment projects.
In the United States, it was the "new rich" of Chicago--particularly the
wives of meat packers, real estate men, manufacturers and department store
owners--who underwrote the support of Hull House, and much the same was
true of the 1,500 other social settlements which developed in the United
States. And it was the industrial wealth of steel, railroad, auto, and other
industries which resulted in the great American foundations which have
played such an important role--both for good and ill--in American social
welfare both domestically and internationally.10
The issue facing the new industrial rich being created all along the Pacific
rim today is a familiar one: How is their wealth to be allocated among
personal consumption, savings and investment, taxation, inheritance,
philanthropy and other objects? This is not merely a personal decision. It is
an issue of great social importance throughout East Asia today, and one of
sufficient complexity that it can only be approached indigenously.
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other rapidly developing Asian
economic powers may wish to adapt American institutions such as trusts and
endowments, foundations, fund-raising campaigns and other related
practices to their own contexts. Or, they may need to develop completely
indigenous ways of doing things.
However, in either case, the advent of the enormous private industrial
wealth occurring here today makes the question of what form the indigenous
patronage of these new Asian rich will take. The issue is probably not
whether or not such patronage will occur. Asia, like Europe and the
Americas, is full of monuments to past patrons. The real issue is where
welfare values will fit in the emerging mixture of philanthropic priorities felt
by these new rich. Will future Asian industrial philanthropists only build
fountains, temples and other monuments, and commission works of art? Or,
will they also come under the influence of welfare values and also support
public health, education, and social services?
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Conclusion
The future direction of social work in Asia, and the prospects of more
complete indigenization of this American import rest heavily on the answer
to that question. If social welfare values have a direct impact upon the
future direction of Asian industrial philanthropy, one can expect to see an
important financial base for voluntary sector social welfare efforts well
beyond those which currently exist. On the other hand, if social welfare
values are ignored or neglected, the welfare state may be the only viable
alternative for the expression of indigenous welfare ideals.
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